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WHO WILL PROTECT THE CONSUMERS OF 
TRADEMARKED GOODS?  
James B. Astrachan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal and state law recognizes multiple forms of intellectual 
property, including patents,1 copyrights,2 trademarks,3 and trade 
secrets.4  Alleged violations of patents and copyrights are required by 
statute to be litigated in the federal courts.5  Trademark rights can 
arise under the Federal Lanham Act6 or state law.7  Trademark 
infringement can be litigated in state or federal courts.8  Trade secrets 
arising under state statutes are litigated in state courts unless diversity 
jurisdiction exists and is pled.9 
Infringement of intellectual property in the case of patents arises 
when a patented invention is used, manufactured or imported into the 
United States without authority of the patentee.10  Copyright 
infringement results when any of the exclusive rights granted to a 
copyright owner under 17 U.S.C. §106 are violated.11  Trademark 
infringement results when a mark is used by a junior user in a manner 
that causes a likelihood of confusion in the minds of consumers, and 
 
* James B. Astrachan, J.D. University of Baltimore Law School (1974), LL.M. 
Georgetown University Law Center (1978).  Member, Astrachan Gunst Thomas, 
P.C., Baltimore, MD, Adjunct Professor of Trademark Law University of Baltimore 
Law School, Carey School of Law, University of Maryland.  The author gratefully 
acknowledges the capable assistance of Kaitlin D. Keating, University of Baltimore 
J.D. and Colin D. McDaniels, University of Baltimore J.D. (2018, expected) for their 
research skills and editing. 
1. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
2. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
3. Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012). 
4. 3 TERRENCE F. MACLAREN & MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS THROUGHOUT THE 
WORLD § 40:1 (2016). 
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012). 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012). 
7. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
22:1.50 (4th ed. 2016). 
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (limiting state court jurisdiction over patent and copyright 
cases, but not over trademarks). 
9. MACLAREN & JAGER, supra note 4, § 40:41. 
10. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
11. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012). 
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potential consumers, with the senior user’s mark as to source, 
connection, sponsorship, approval or affiliation.12  
Remedies for infringement of intellectual property rights include 
monetary damages to compensate the owner for its pecuniary loss 
caused by the infringement, including recovery of lost profits.13  In 
the case of patent infringement, an award of lost profits can take the 
form of imposition of a reasonable royalty to compensate the patentee 
for its loss.14  Copyright and trademark owners can be awarded actual 
damages and the infringer’s profits, subject to a prohibition against 
double recovery in the case of copyright.15  A trademark owner can 
recover an infringer’s profits and its own damages.16  The statute 
allows a court to award up to three times the actual damages and 
profits earned.17  Monetary damages in the form of statutory damages 
may also be available to copyright and trademark owners.18  An 
award of monetary damages is intended to deprive a defendant of its 
gains at the expense of the right’s owner.19  
In addition to monetary awards, courts are authorized to enjoin 
infringers of trademarks, copyrights, and patents from continuing 
their infringing activities through injunctive relief.20  An injunction 
can be issued before or after trial on the merits.21  A preliminary 
injunction is relief sought before trial on the merits,22 and a 
permanent injunction is relief sought following trial on the merits or 
other dispositions, such as summary judgment.23  Injunctive relief is 
not awarded lightly.  The Supreme Court of the United States has 
observed that “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 
 
12. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
24:6 (4th ed. 2016). 
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (patents); 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012) (copyright); 15 
U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (recovery for violations of rights). 
14. 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
15. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
17. Id. 
18. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2012). 
19. Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1157 (7th Cir. 1994); Web 
Printing Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1990). 
20. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012) (patents); 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012) (trademarks); 17 U.S.C. § 
502 (2012) (copyrights). 
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 65.1. 
22. Ansel v. Hicks, 846 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (citing In re Microsoft 
Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 524–26 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
23. See generally U.S. Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 
515, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating permanent injunctions may be granted in 
trademark and copyright infringement actions). 
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never awarded as of right.”24  A permanent injunction is, likewise, a 
“drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a 
matter of course.”25  
Often sought in a trademark infringement claim is preliminary 
injunctive relief, issued prior to a trial on the merits, to prevent the 
infringer from continuing its unlawful activities.  To be entitled to 
preliminary injunctive relief, the owner of the trademark who is 
alleging infringement must establish at an early stage of litigation that 
it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim.26  In addition, the 
movant is generally required to establish that it will suffer irreparable 
harm.27  Irreparable harm is an injury that cannot be adequately 
compensated by monetary payment.28  Damages to a business’s 
intangible assets, such as reputation and goodwill, have also been 
considered harm that is irreparable and from which injunctive relief 
might follow.29  Irreparable harm might also occur where monetary 
damages might otherwise compensate for the harm, but the defendant 
is found by the court to be incapable of paying a monetary award 
sufficient to make the plaintiff whole.30  The movant seeking 
injunctive relief must further establish that the public interest will be 
served by an injunction and that the balance of the hardships favors 
its issuance.31  
The grant of preliminary injunctive relief in a trademark 
infringement matter may end the litigation.  If the defendant can no 
longer use the mark, pending trial, it may choose to adopt an 
alternative mark and get on with its business.  In preliminary stages 
of infringement, there may not be profits to recover, and a junior user 
ordered to cease use of an infringing mark may abandon its efforts 
regarding the contested mark.  Instead, a junior user may adopt a 
 
24. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 
553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008)). 
25. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010); see Weinberger v. 
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). 
26. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. 
27. Id. 
28. Jayaraj v. Scappini, 66 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. 
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
29. Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1987). 
30. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(explaining that monetary damages can be an insufficient remedy if: (1) the damage 
award comes too late to save the plaintiff’s business; (2) the plaintiff cannot finance 
the lawsuit; (3) the damages are unobtainable because the defendant is insolvent; or 
(4) the nature of the plaintiff’s loss may make damages very difficult to calculate). 
31. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§§ 30:51–30:52 (4th ed. 2016). 
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replacement mark, preferring to find a mark under which to sell 
goods or services with which it can establish goodwill and source 
identification without risk. 
Injunctive relief may also be granted, in the form of a permanent 
injunction, following trial, or grant of a motion for summary 
judgment in favor of the movant, where the owner of the infringed 
intellectual property rights has prevailed on the merits of its claim.32  
All of the other factors listed above must also be established to obtain 
permanent injunctive relief.33  
The legislative history of the Lanham Act (the “Act”) is “long and 
extensive.”34  Congressman Fritz Lanham, for whom the legislation is 
named, in testimony offered to the United States House of 
Representatives, averred that the purpose of his namesake bill was 
“to protect legitimate business and the consumers of the country.”35  
Both of these goals remain in place although the language contained 
in the Act does not recognize the right of a consumer to bring an 
action against a commercial party under the Act.36  
This article explores whether the courts should consider trademark 
infringement in a different light from patent and copyright 
infringement, for purposes of determining whether a trademark 
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must establish irreparable harm, or 
whether irreparable harm should be presumed when the trademark 
owner seeking injunctive relief establishes it is likely to succeed, or 
has succeeded at trial, on the merits of its claim that confusion is 
likely to result if the defendant is allowed ongoing use of the 
contested mark.37  Examining this question, this article explores the 
differences in the nature of the rights protected by trademarks, as 
distinguished from patents and copyrights.38  It also examines 
whether courts should protect consumers who have no standing under 
the Act in trademark disputes that exist between the users, or owners, 
of two marks, but who are often injured, nevertheless, by the 
resulting confusion, and whether it should consider the harm caused 
to consumers by trademark infringers where considering whether 
injunctive relief should be granted.39 
 
32. Intervisual Commc’ns, Inc. v. Volkert, 975 F. Supp. 1092, 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1997) 
(citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506–07 (1959)). 
33. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 
34. 92 CONG. REC. 6, 7524 (1946) (statement of Rep. Lanham). 
35. Id. 
36. See Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 469 (9th Cir. 1995); Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l 
Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1179 (3d Cir. 1993). 
37. See infra pp. 379–85. 
38. See infra pp. 389–92. 
39. See infra pp. 392–95. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Until 2006, it was generally assumed by litigants and courts that if 
a movant seeking a preliminary injunction for infringement of its 
intellectual property could establish that it had a meritorious claim—
meaning, infringement likely had occurred and was ongoing—the 
harm to the movant would be considered irreparable.40  On that basis, 
an injunction would be issued if the other two factors—public interest 
and balance of the hardships—were decided in the movant’s favor.41  
In essence, upon a showing of likelihood of success on the merits, 
courts were inclined to presume from the movant’s showing that 
trademark infringement occurred, or was likely to occur, that 
irreparable harm to the mark’s owner would result.42  This result 
followed, in the opinion of some courts, because the senior trademark 
user (the movant) had lost the ability to restrict use and control of its 
property right.43  Preliminary injunctions, then, followed a showing 
of likelihood of success on the merits without the movant’s need to 
offer any evidence that it had actually suffered irreparable harm.44 
In 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States directly changed 
the assumption that irreparable harm would be presumed in a patent 
infringement action and indirectly in a copyright action.45  The Court 
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC was confronted with the issue of 
whether irreparable harm resulting from a finding of patent 
infringement following trial on the merits should be presumed in the 
absence of evidence of actual irreparable harm, or whether it must be 
established by the patentee before a permanent injunction would 
issue after the patentee had succeeded on the merits of its patent 
infringement claim.46 
eBay was appealed from the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia to the Federal Circuit Court, and then to the Supreme 
Court.47  The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Federal 
Circuit Court, which in essence had ruled that upon a showing of 
 
40. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
41. Id. at 391–92 (majority opinion). 
42. See id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
43. See, e.g., U.S. Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515, 
540 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 511 F. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2013); 5 MCCARTHY, supra 
note 31, § 30:47. 
44. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544–46 (1987). 
45. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 392–93. 
46. Id. at 391. 
47. Id. at 393–94. 
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infringement, a patentee was generally entitled to injunctive relief.48  
In reversing the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court held that general 
equitable principles govern the grant of a permanent injunction, and 
that principles controlling whether a court should grant equitable 
relief are embodied in a four-factor test which includes (1) the 
existence of irreparable injury; (2) inadequacy of remedies at law; (3) 
balancing the hardships; and (4) whether the public interest would be 
served by injunctive relief.49  The Court’s holding, that irreparable 
harm is not to be presumed but must be established, has been applied 
by some courts in copyright50 and trademark cases.51  Indeed, the 
Court wrote that this standard was applicable to copyright actions,52 
but failed to discuss trademark actions. 
That the patentee won its trial and established both infringement 
and validity of its patent was not sufficient grounds for the district 
court to grant injunctive relief preventing the infringer from using, 
manufacturing or selling the patented software.53  The district court 
judge, Judge Friedman, first recognized “when, as here, ‘validity and 
continuing infringement have been clearly established . . . immediate 
irreparable harm is presumed.’”54  But this, he next observed, was a 
rebuttable presumption.55  Judge Friedman concluded that the 
presumption of irreparable harm that might have otherwise existed 
with a finding of infringement was rebutted because the patentee, a 
non-practicing entity, had not excluded others from practicing the 
invention but had, instead, licensed third parties, and had even 
offered its invention to the Defendant who had refused a license but 
took the technology nevertheless.56  The Defendant opposed the 
motion for injunctive relief arguing that money damages were an 
adequate remedy.57  The court’s denial of the requested injunction 
was appealed to the Federal Circuit, which reversed the district 
court’s failure to grant injunctive relief and remanded.58  The Federal 
Circuit reiterated that it is the “general rule that courts will issue 
 
48. Id. at 394. 
49. Id. at 391–92. 
50. Bethesda Softworks, LLC v. Interplay Entm’t Corp., 452 F. App’x 351, 354 (4th Cir. 
2011); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2010). 
51. Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
52. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 392. 
53. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 710–15 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
54. Id. at 711 (alteration in original) (quoting Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. 
Supp. 2d 785, 794 (E.D. Va. 1998)). 
55. Id. at 712. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 713. 
58. MercExchange, LLC, v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional 
circumstances,” which, in essence, established a presumption in 
patent infringement matters that would need to be followed by district 
courts hearing patent claims, and, of course, the Federal Circuit.59  
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Federal 
Circuit’s decision, holding that irreparable harm should not be 
presumed in patent infringement cases seeking injunctive relief and 
that a plaintiff must establish it has suffered irreparable harm and that 
harm will continue in the absence of an injunction.60  
Two years following its decision in eBay, the Supreme Court in 
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, reiterated its holding 
in eBay.61  This time the Court dealt with a preliminary, not a 
permanent, injunction.62  The Court held that a party seeking 
preliminary injunctive relief must demonstrate that irreparable harm 
is likely in the absence of an injunction.63  The Court directed lower 
courts to “pay particular regard for the public consequences in 
employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.”64  But, ironically, 
the Court did not consider the regard for public consequences 
resulting from the failure to grant injunctive relief.65 
In eBay, the Supreme Court dealt specifically with patent 
infringement, but also held that the requirement to obtain injunctive 
relief “is consistent with our treatment of injunctions under the 
Copyright Act.”66  In so holding, the Court signaled that a party 
seeking injunctive relief in a patent and a copyright infringement 
action must establish irreparable harm, and that it is not permissible 
for a court to presume irreparable harm exists.67  Thus, once the 
Supreme Court had specifically dealt with copyright and patent 
actions, it became logical for courts to question whether the holdings 
of the Supreme Court in eBay and Winter also applied to trademark 
actions.  Surely there was no limiting language contained in either 
decision that would prevent Winter and eBay from applying to 
 
59. Id. at 1339. 
60. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006). 
61. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). 
62. Id. at 12. 
63. Id. at 24. 
64. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)). 
65. See generally id. at 24–34 (explaining the variables the court considers in granting 
injunctive relief for a preliminary injunction). 
66. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006). 
67. Id. at 391, 394. 
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trademark infringement actions.68  Nor was there any specific 
reference in those cases to trademark causes of action.69 
The question remains unanswered by the Supreme Court whether a 
movant who has established likelihood of confusion in a trademark 
action is entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm or, whether the 
movant must establish to the court’s satisfaction that it has suffered, 
and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm.  It is not surprising that 
various courts have come to differing conclusions concerning 
irreparable harm in trademark actions in the absence of direct 
instructions from the Supreme Court.70  
III. DISCUSSION 
Since Winter and eBay were decided, there have been sporadic 
lower court decisions addressing whether, in a trademark 
infringement case, a party moving for preliminary or permanent 
injunctive relief is required to establish (along with the other three 
necessary factors) that irreparable harm will occur if the injunction is 
not issued.71  The question is hardly resolved.  
A number of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, including the 
Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, have addressed 
whether irreparable harm in an intellectual property infringement 
action must be established in order for an injunction to be issued, but 
not all of these courts have addressed this question in the context of 
trademark infringement.72  For instance, the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Salinger and the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Bethesda 
Softworks LLC v. Interplay Entertainment Corp., require the movant 
to establish irreparable harm in copyright cases, rather than presume 
irreparable harm upon a finding of likelihood of success, or actual 
success, on the merits.73   
 
68. See generally Winter, 555 U.S. at 23–24 (discussing the requirements for the 
preliminary injunction of the Navy’s sonar training); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 390–94 
(recognizing that injunctive relief for copyright and patent infringement is granted at 
the discretion of the court). 
69. See generally Winter, 555 U.S. at 23–24; eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 390–94. 
70. See Ronald T. Coleman, Jr., Trishanda L. Treadwell & Elizabeth A. Loyd, 
Applicability of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm After eBay, 32 FRANCHISE L.J. 
3, 5–7 (2002). 
71. See id. 
72. Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2014); 
Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Florida Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1248–49 (9th 
Cir. 2013); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2010); N. Am. Med. Corp. 
v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008).  
73. Bethesda Softworks, LLC v. Interplay Entm’t Corp., 452 F. App’x 351, 354–55 (4th 
Cir. 2011); Salinger, 607 F.3d at 78. 
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In some circuits, such as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
district courts within the circuit are extrapolating their circuit court’s 
decision in another subject area, such as Salinger to copyrights, to 
actions brought to enjoin trademark infringement.74  There are no 
decisions from the Second Circuit holding that irreparable harm 
cannot be presumed in a trademark infringement case.  However, that 
court in Salinger applied the Supreme Court’s eBay decision relating 
to eradication of the presumption of irreparable harm to copyright 
infringement actions.75  On the basis of Salinger, at least one district 
court in the Second Circuit has applied the holding in Salinger to 
actions brought to enjoin trademark infringement.76  Whereas the 
District Court for the District of Connecticut in ComPsych Corp. v. 
Health Champion LLC did not directly decide whether Salinger’s 
decision against the presumption of irreparable harm extends to 
trademark cases, the court cited to the Salinger decision wherein the 
court stated that it found “no reason that eBay would not apply with 
equal force to an injunction in any type of case.”77  Furthermore, the 
court acknowledged that following the Salinger decision, “most 
courts have applied eBay’s standard to trademark actions.”78  Once 
again, there was no analysis of the differences, if any, in the harm 
suffered from trademark versus copyright infringement, or by whom 
the harm will be suffered. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, upon a finding of likelihood 
of success on the merits, appears to favor a presumption of 
irreparable harm in trademark infringement actions.  While it does 
not directly say so, in its decision in Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC 
v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., the court went so far as to 
hold, “irreparable harm is especially likely in a trademark case 
because of the difficulty of quantifying the likely effect on a brand of 
a nontrivial period of consumer confusion (and the interval between 
the filing of a trademark infringement complaint and final judgment 
is sure not to be trivial).”79  It would appear from this decision that, in 
its decision to grant injunctive relief, the court connects a “strong 
 
74. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AGA Sols., Inc. 589 F. Supp. 2d 195, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
75. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77. 
76. U.S. Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515, 539–40 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
77. ComPsych Corp. v. Health Champion LLC, No. 3:12CV692 (VLB), 2012 WL 
6212653, at *4 (D. Conn. Dec. 13, 2012). 
78. Id. 
79. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 
735, 741 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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likelihood of prevailing in the full trial” and the damage done to the 
mark’s owner if the injunction is denied.80  Arguably under Winter, 
the first element, the likelihood of prevailing on the trademark 
infringement claim must be established by the movant, but once 
established it would appear improper to resort to a sliding scale by 
which the need to issue the injunction increases with the strength of 
the likelihood of prevailing on the merits.81 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the issue of 
whether irreparable harm should be presumed in a trademark case in 
Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Medical News Now, Inc.82  
Appellant appealed the grant of a preliminary injunction following 
the district court’s determination that in a trademark case irreparable 
harm is presumed once the movant establishes it is likely to succeed 
in establishing infringement.83  The appellant contended that the 
district court’s presumption was inconsistent with the eBay opinion.84  
The First Circuit Court of Appeals did not decide whether such a 
presumption was categorically correct and instead reversed the 
district court on the grounds that the district court abused its 
discretion by applying the presumption in a situation where appellee 
waited almost ten years before moving to enjoin the infringement.85  
The court wrote:  
[I]t is unnecessary to decide at this time whether the rule 
relied upon by the district court (i.e., irreparable harm is 
presumed upon a finding of likelihood of success on the 
merits of a trademark infringement claim) is consistent with 
such principles, because—even if we assume without 
deciding that such rule is good law—we still find that the 
district court abused its discretion . . . .86 
Both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
examined whether a presumption of irreparable harm exists in a 
trademark infringement matter, or whether the party seeking 
injunctive relief must establish it will suffer irreparable harm in the 
 
80. Id. at 740. 
81. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 51 (2008). 
82. Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 31 (1st 
Cir. 2011). 
83. Id. at 28. 
84. Id. at 31. 
85. Id. at 34–35. 
86. Id. at 31. 
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absence of an injunction.87  In Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. Florida 
Entertainment Management, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recited, “[a]s the district court acknowledged, two recent Supreme 
Court cases have cast doubt on the validity of this court’s previous 
rule that the likelihood of ‘irreparable injury may be 
presumed . . . .’”88  Relying on the Supreme Court’s dicta that 
“[n]othing in the Patent Act indicates that Congress intended such a 
departure” from the need to establish irreparable harm, the court 
appropriated the reasoning from the Supreme Court’s conclusion that 
patent and copyright claims were of a similar nature and held that “so 
too nothing in the Lanham Act indicates that Congress intended a 
departure for trademark infringement cases.”89  Perhaps if the court 
had considered the distinction of patent and copyright causes of 
action as compared to trademark actions, and the difference in harm 
resulting to consumers, it would not have so ruled, or at least, not 
without better explanation.  
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit, using strong language, held that a 
party seeking permanent or preliminary injunctive relief in a 
trademark case must establish irreparable harm; it will not be 
presumed regardless of whether the party can establish it is likely to 
succeed on the merits.90 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in a decision dealing with 
the Lanham Act, abolished the presumption of irreparable harm, after 
extending such a presumption for many years.91  The basis for the 
abolition of the presumption of irreparable harm was the court’s 
belief that it needed to adhere to the “traditional principles of equity” 
cited by the Supreme Court in eBay.92  The Eleventh Circuit also 
considered the similarity of the language affording injunctive relief in 
 
87. Compare Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1251 
(9th Cir. 2013) (finding that plaintiffs in a trademark infringement case “seeking 
injunctive relief must proffer evidence sufficient to establish a likelihood of 
irreparable harm”), with N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 
1211, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that “prior cases do extend a presumption of 
irreparable harm once a plaintiff establishes a likelihood of success on the merits of a 
trademark infringement claim”). 
88. Herb Reed Enters., LLC, 736 F.3d at 1248–49 (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. 
v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
89. Id. at 1249 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 
(2006)). 
90. Id. at 1251. 
91. See N. Am. Med. Corp., 522 F.3d at 1227–29; Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. 
Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1026, 1029 (11th Cir. 1989). 
92. N. Am. Med. Corp., 522 F.3d at 1228 (quoting eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 393). 
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both the Lanham and Patent Acts as a basis for its decision.93  There 
was an analysis of the different damages caused by patent and 
trademark infringement, but not the persons to whom those damages 
might apply and why.94 
It is quite clear that to some courts, there is little difference 
between patent and copyright actions, and the harm caused thereby, 
whether to the interests of a commercial party, or to consumers who 
rely on trademarks to analyze and select goods and services.95 
Recently, Judge David N. Hurd, United States District Judge for 
the Northern District of New York, succinctly summarized what he 
viewed as the state of the law regarding presumption of irreparable 
harm in the Second Circuit.96  The cause of action he addressed was 
not trademark infringement, but was instead false advertising, also a 
violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.97  After reciting the 
necessary elements that must be established for a successful cause of 
action, Judge Hurd began his analysis of the preliminary injunction 
standard by quoting Magistrate Judge Mann’s decision in Golden 
Krust Patties, Inc. v. Bullock: “[t]o say that there is confusion in this 
Circuit regarding the appropriate standard for assessing an 
application for a preliminary injunction would be an 
understatement.”98  Nevertheless, the court did not conclude either 
way regarding whether a presumption of irreparable harm exists, or 
whether a movant must prove that irreparable harm will follow denial 
of an injunction. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided another case in which 
false advertising in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was 
alleged.99  The court held it had never recognized a presumption of 
irreparable harm in a false advertising case.100  The Third Circuit, 
however, had applied a presumption of irreparable harm in trademark 
cases under the Act prior to eBay and Winter.101  It noted that, in 




95. See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391–93.  It is very unlikely that a consumer buying a 
garden hose cares who owns the patent to that hose, but it is much more likely to rely 
on the trademark under which it is sold to judge quality, value, and reliability. 
96. Chobani, LLC v. Dannon Co., 157 F. Supp. 3d 190, 203–05 (N.D.N.Y. 2016). 
97. Id. at 194, 199. 
98. Id. at 198 (quoting Golden Krust Patties, Inc. v. Bullock, 957 F. Supp. 2d 186, 194 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013)). 
99. Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 206–07 (3d Cir. 2014). 
100. Id. at 210. 
101. Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 726 (3d Cir. 2004); Opticians Ass’n 
of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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potentially at risk for damage to the “product or brand’s 
reputation.”102  That, the court wrote, would cause irreparable harm 
that was difficult to quantify.103  Nevertheless, the injury that the 
court recognized was injury to the seller of the goods that were the 
subject of the false claims—not, it would appear, the consumers 
injured because they bought the goods in reliance on the false claims.  
Noting that “[t]he Lanham Act’s injunctive relief provision is 
premised upon traditional principles of equity, like the Patent 
Act’s,”104 the Third Circuit adopted the rational, applying it at least to 
false advertising claims brought under the Act, and held that “a 
presumption of irreparable harm deviates from the traditional 
principles of equity, which require a movant to demonstrate 
irreparable harm.”105  Thus, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
eliminated the presumption of irreparable harm “afforded to parties 
seeking injunctive relief in Lanham Act cases,” at least as to false 
advertising claims.106  It did not distinguish between false advertising 
cases and trademark infringement cases, and based on its decision in 
Ferring, there is little or no reason to expect that the court would rule 
differently if the matter before it were a trademark infringement 
action and the allegation was that the defendant’s infringement 
caused consumer confusion.  Arguably, as does trademark 
infringement, false advertising affects the buying decisions of 
consumers and harms more than just the competitor; it results in 
deception of the consumers who rely on the false claim.  However, 
the court discussed only the harm to the competitor.107  It failed in 
any way to mention the effect of false advertising on consumers and 
the harm that results. 
Since the decisions of eBay and Winter, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has not addressed the question of whether irreparable harm 
should be presumed in trademark cases.  The last time the Fourth 
Circuit ruled concerning the presumption of irreparable harm in a 
case arising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was in 2002.108  
In Scotts, confronted with a false advertising claim, the court wrote, 
 
102. Ferring Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d at 212. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 214. 
105. Id. at 216. 
106. Id. 
107. See generally id.  The Third Circuit took a lengthy sojourn exploring how false 
advertising dilutes competitive advantages, only mentioning consumers in the aspect 
of their money, not the harm that can be caused to them based on the false 
advertising.  Id. 
108. Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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“[i]n Lanham Act cases involving trademark infringement, a 
presumption of irreparable injury is generally applied once the 
plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of confusion, the key element 
in an infringement case.”109  Since Scotts, there have been a number 
of district court decisions in the Fourth Circuit, even since eBay and 
Winter, that have held in favor of such a presumption of irreparable 
harm.110  
For example, in Rebel Debutante LLC v. Forsythe Cosmetic Group, 
Ltd., Judge Schroeder recognized that injunctive relief is “an 
extraordinary remedy . . . which is to be applied only in [the] limited 
circumstances which clearly demand it.”111  Although Judge 
Schroeder recognized that “a  plaintiff must establish . . . that he is 
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” 
he acknowledged that “in the context of a Lanham Act trademark 
infringement case . . . ‘a presumption of irreparable injury is 
generally applied once the plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of 
confusion, the key element in an infringement case.’”112  Judge 
Schroeder referred to eBay in his opinion but distinguished it from 
the matter at hand on several grounds.113  First, eBay involved a 
permanent injunction and Rebel Debutante dealt with a preliminary 
injunction, an order requested to preserve the status quo until trial.114  
Second, he distinguished copyright and patent cases from trademark 
cases, in which he wrote (referring to trademark actions), “where 
confusion may have long-lasting effects.”115  And finally, he relied on 
the fact that other district courts in the Fourth Circuit applied the 
presumption in trademark actions.116  Judge Schroeder did not 
 
109. Id. at 273 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Nat. Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 
2000); Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 
1997)). 
110. PGI Polymer, Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 3:15-CV-00214-FDW-DSC, 2015 
WL 5920013, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2015); Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Zeal, LLC, 
135 F. Supp. 3d 451, 456–57 (D.S.C. 2015); De Simone v. VSL Pharm., Inc., 133 F. 
Supp. 3d 776, 780 (D. Md. 2015); Diamonds Direct USA, Inc. v. BFJ Holdings, Inc., 
895 F. Supp. 2d 752, 755 (E.D. Va. 2012); Rebel Debutante LLC v. Forsythe 
Cosmetic Grp., Ltd., 799 F. Supp. 2d 558, 580 (M.D.N.C. 2011). 
111. Rebel Debutante LLC, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. 
Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991)). 
112. Id. at 568, 579 (first quoting W. Va. Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Services, 
Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009); and then quoting Scotts Co. v. 
United Industries Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 273 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
113. Id. at 579. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. (citing Meineke Car Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Catton, No. 3:10-CV-000234-RLV-DSC, 
2010 WL 2572875, at *2 (W.D.N.C. June 24, 2010); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. S & 
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identify, however, the victim of the long-lasting effects of confusion, 
whether it be the mark’s owner, the consumers of the goods identified 
by the mark, or both. 
District courts within the Fourth Circuit are not completely settled 
regarding the presumption of irreparable harm and at least one has 
broken ranks with other district courts that favor the existence of a 
presumption of irreparable harm once likelihood of confusion on the 
merits is established.  Judge Davis of the Eastern District of Virginia, 
in Pro-Concepts v. Resh, questioned whether the presumption of 
irreparable harm in a trademark infringement action still exists 
following the Supreme Court’s Winter decision.117  Judge Davis 
wrote, “As a threshold matter, it is unlikely that the presumption 
alleged in the context of trademark infringement remains viable after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter.”118  Elaborating further 
Judge Davis stated that because a plaintiff bears the burden to 
establish irreparable harm, “the Court should not rely on a 
presumption of irreparable injury based on the likelihood that [the 
Defendant’s] actions—whether intentional or not—are likely to 
confuse or mislead . . . .”119  In Pro-Concepts, however, it would 
appear that the court concluded that the evidence presented did not 
establish irreparable injury.  Nevertheless, it appears that Judge Davis 
did not recognize the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark 
infringement cases and his basis for not doing so was Winter. 
Most of the decisions of the district courts in the Fourth Circuit that 
continue to adopt the presumption that irreparable harm follows a 
finding of likelihood of success on the merits, do so with little or no 
reason expressed, other than to hold that the Supreme Court in eBay 
did not apply the presumption to preliminary injunctions120 or to 
 
M Brands, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 581, 587 (E.D. Va. 2009); Toolchex, Inc. v. Trainor, 
634 F. Supp. 2d 586, 591 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2008)). 
117. Pro-Concepts, LLC v. Resh, No. 2:12CV573, 2013 WL 5741542, at *21 (E.D. Va. 
Oct. 22, 2013). 
118. Id.  Judge Davis held that in this trademark action, the court would not rely on a 
presumption of irreparable injury resulting from confusion of customers.  Id. 
119. Id. 
120. In relying on the holding in eBay that the Supreme Court did not apply the 
presumption to a preliminary injunction, the 2011 decision Rebel Debutante LLC v. 
Forsythe Cosmetic Group, Ltd. appears to overlook the Supreme Court’s 2008 
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. decision, which did involve a 
preliminary injunction and abolished the presumption of irreparable harm.  See Rebel 
Debutante LLC, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 579; Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 
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trademark actions.121  Judge Deborah Chasanow, sitting in the 
Southern Division of the District of Maryland, adopted the 
presumption of irreparable harm in a case in which the author 
represented the plaintiff in a trademark infringement action.122  Judge 
Chasanow held that, “Plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm 
from Defendant’s continued unauthorized use of its marks.”123  She 
ruled that courts generally will presume that irreparable harm has 
occurred where the trademark owner establishes it is likely to succeed 
on the merits of its infringement claim.124  Judge Chasanow, 
however, delved a bit deeper and explained the cause of irreparable 
harm, citing Judge Learned Hand’s pronouncement, as applied by the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, “if 
another uses [someone’s trademark], he borrows the owner’s 
reputation whose quality no longer lies within his own control.  This 
is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert 
any sales by its use.”125  
There is a distinction to be drawn between the damages caused 
from trademark infringement as contrasted with the damages caused 
by patent and copyright infringement.  In the typical patent or 
copyright infringement case, the plaintiff has lost the ability to 
exclusively control the use of the invention or expression, or to say it 
another way, the owner of these property rights is granted, by statute, 
a right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale or 
selling the patented invention,126 or from reproducing, distributing, 
or, among other rights, creating derivative works from the 
copyrighted expression.127  The common thread that is sewn by 
Congress joining rights granted to patentees and holders of 
copyrights is the right to exclude others from use.128  The mere fact 
that an infringer has violated any of the exclusive rights of the patent 
or copyright holder may result in the loss of monetary benefit to the 
owner of the right.  And often the owner of the right earns its income 
from the right by licensing others to practice or otherwise exploit the 
right.  Consumers are not directly affected by the infringement. 
 
121. Rebel Debutante LLC, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 579–80 (quoting National League of 
Junior Cotillions, Inc. v. Porter, No. 3:06-CV-508-RJC, 2007 WL 2316823, at *6 
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2007), aff’d, 280 F. App’x 322 (4th Cir. 2008)). 
122. Potomac Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Takoma Acad. Alumni 
Ass’n, Inc., No. DKC 13-1128, 2014 WL 857947, at *19 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2014). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. (quoting Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1535 (4th Cir. 1984)). 
126. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). 
127. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
128. See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). 
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As the Supreme Court has clearly established, a party seeking an 
injunction, whether preliminary or permanent, must establish that it 
will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the grant of the 
injunction.129  Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in eBay 
noted that the world of patent rights has changed and that “[a]n 
industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for 
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining 
licensing fees.”130  It is logical to require a party seeking an 
injunction in a patent or copyright case where damages may be either 
irreparable or merely monetary to establish to the court that in the 
absence of injunctive relief the party will indeed suffer irreparable 
harm that cannot be compensated for by monetary damages. 
IV.   THE NEED FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION 
When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Herb Reed 
Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entertainment Management, Inc., held 
that “nothing in the Lanham Act indicates that Congress intended a 
departure for trademark infringement cases,”131 perhaps it could have 
dug a bit deeper into what Congress intended when the Act was 
debated and later enacted, and whom Congress intended to protect by 
its enactment.  Trademarks are different than patents and copyrights 
as trademarks serve a different purpose than patents and copyrights.  
In general terms, trademarks serve to designate a source of goods and 
services.132  Surely, to their owners they are valuable intangible assets 
and must be protected from infringers.  But, within this value, to their 
owners lies their core value.  Trademarks allow consumers to choose 
among goods based on the quality of the goods and the reputation of 
the source.133  For this reason alone, courts should not treat 
trademarks as they do patents and copyrights when a movant seeks 
injunctive relief.  Professor McCarthy has observed that the basic 
policy behind the law of unfair competition is “[t]he interest of the 
public in not being deceived.”134  The second purpose, more akin to 
patent and copyright policy, is to protect a plaintiff’s property rights 
 
129. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
130. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
131. Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Florida Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
132. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
3:1 (4th ed. 2016). 
133. Id. § 3:10. 
134. Id. § 2:1 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694 
(S.D.N.Y. 1963)). 
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built up through use of its marks.135  Thus, McCarthy opines there are 
two goals of modern trademark law: to protect consumers from 
confusion and deception, and to protect the plaintiff’s property.136  
Professor McCarthy’s opinion is supported by the 1992 decision of 
the Supreme Court recognizing that trademarks, or trade dress, allow 
consumers to select the goods or services of another.137  This policy, 
or goal, was reported by the United States Senate in a 1946 report 
relating to the Act.  The report read, in part: 
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. 
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in 
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which 
it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for 
and wants to get.138 
In addition to the protection of the public, another goal of 
trademark law expressed in the report is the protection of the mark’s 
owner’s interest in time and money in building the value and 
recognition of the mark.139  When the provisions of Section 32 of the 
Act were debated in 1944, Representative Lanham testified on behalf 
of its inclusion with a view of protecting the public.140  As did 
Congressman Lanham almost seventy years ago, the Supreme Court 




137. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992).  
138. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1274 (1946). 
139. Id. 
140. An Act to Provide for the Registration and Protection of Trade-marks Used in 
Commerce, to Carry Out the Provisions of Certain International Conventions, and 
for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 82 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on 
Patents, 78th Cong. 73 (1944) (“Since we are trying to protect the public, I think we 
are going pretty far afield with reference to some possibilities that might arise.”) 
(statement of Rep. Fritz G. Lanham).  Additionally, Representative Lanham testified:  
I think that the protection of the public is of paramount 
importance with reference to goods that the public consumes and 
that some second party ought not be allowed to come along, take 
liberties with the trade-mark, and represent that it is just about the 
same thing or the same product exactly. 
 Id.  The Department of Justice presented its opinion on the topics at these hearings.  
Responding to Representative Lanham’s above comments, Justice Department 
representative Moyer testified, “I may say that I agree completely with Congressman 
Lanham’s statement as to the necessity of protecting the public.  I believe we are one 
in wishing for public protection and prevention of the palming off of one person’s 
goods as the goods of another person.”  Id. at 74 (statement by Spec. Assistant to 
Att’y Gen. Elliot H. Moyer). 
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consumers from being misled by the use of infringing marks.141  The 
Fourth Circuit, likewise, has held “Congress intended the Lanham 
Act to protect consumers from confusion in the marketplace . . . .”142 
The protection of consumers from confusion and deception is not 
the only benefit provided to consumers by trademarks.  For example, 
trademarks allow consumers to distinguish high quality products 
from those of lower quality.143 
Still another consumer benefit provided by trademarks is that 
trademarks reduce the cost of learning about a product.144  Without 
brand names or other means of identifying makers of goods, or 
providers of services, consumers face larger risks and incur greater 
costs of developing information about goods and services.145  Judge 
Posner echoed the belief that trademarks are of great value to 
consumers: 
 The fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce 
consumer search costs by providing a concise and 
unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular 
goods. The consumer who knows at a glance whose brand 
he is being asked to buy knows whom to hold responsible if 
the brand disappoints and whose product to buy in the future 
if the brand pleases.146 
Judge Posner expressed what he believed to be the fundamental 
benefit a trademark imparts to a consumer: ease and reduced cost of 
selection of goods and services.147  He also touched on the issue of 
reputation of the mark’s owner.148  But, clearly, Judge Posner 
recognized that a trademark affixed to goods provides a valuable 
benefit directly to consumers, and the results of that benefit 
encourage a trademark owner to maintain the quality of the goods 
and services that bear the mark—yet another benefit to consumers 
who have come to rely on a mark in their selection of goods and 
services. 
 
141. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003). 
142. Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 323 (4th Cir. 2015). 
143. RICHARD CRASWELL, FTC OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, TRADEMARKS, CONSUMER 
INFORMATION AND BARRIERS TO COMPETITION 15 (1979). 
144. See ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: 
COMPETITION, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL 110–11 (John Mahaney & Larry Olsen 
eds., 2d ed. 1977). 
145. See id. 
146. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
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Consumers of trademarked goods do not have standing to sue 
trademark infringers under the Act.  The Supreme Court has held that 
“[i]dentifying the interests protected by the Lanham Act, however, 
requires no guesswork, since the Act includes an ‘unusual, and 
extraordinarily helpful,’ detailed statement of the statute’s 
purposes.”149  And while the language of the Court would state that 
the Act’s goal is the protection of persons engaged in commerce 
within Congress’ control, the other decisions of the Court,150 and the 
legislative history of the Act,151 make clear that a purpose of the Act 
is the protection of consumers.  Courts have excluded those who are 
not engaged in commerce and within a so-called “zone-of-interests” 
from standing to bring a suit for trademark infringement or false 
advertising.152  That clearly excludes a consumer who has been 
deceived by an infringer’s use of another’s mark.  And while this 
makes sense to avoid clogging the federal courts with consumer suits 
over infringement, the non-commercial interests of those consumers 
are worthy of protection, and are a stated goal of the Act.  Who, then, 
protects consumers of trademarked goods under the Act if consumers 
are unable to protect themselves? 
In order to establish a claim for trademark infringement under the 
Act, the plaintiff must establish that the use of the mark by the 
defendant is likely to result in confusion as to source of the goods, 
sponsorship or affiliation.153  Each circuit has adopted its own set of 
factors it applies to determine whether there is a likelihood of 
 
149. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1389 (2014) 
(quoting H.B. Halicki Prods v. United Artists Commc’ns, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 
(9th Cir. 1987).  Section 45 of the Act provides:  
 The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within 
the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and 
misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered 
marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or 
territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such 
commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and 
deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, 
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to 
provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions 
respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition 
entered into between the United States and foreign nations. 
 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
150. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). 
151. Hearing on H.R. 82 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Patents, supra note 140, 
at 73–74 (statements of Rep. Fritz G. Lanham & Spec. Assistant to Att'y Gen. Elliot 
H. Moyer). 
152. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 
(2014). 
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
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confusion arising from the use by defendant of a mark, but all sets of 
factors are similar.154  When the question of whether the use of the 
defendant’s mark is likely to result in consumer confusion is 
answered in the affirmative, infringement has been established.155  
Once that occurs, injury to two interests have occurred.  First, there is 
damage to a plaintiff’s property interest in its mark.  Assuming for 
argument’s sake that the defendant is making its product exactly as 
the plaintiff does, that its warranty and customer service is exactly the 
same as plaintiff’s, and that there is absolutely no difference in the 
quality, safety, and longevity of the two products, then arguably 
plaintiff’s reputation has not suffered, and plaintiff has only lost 
profits from the sales made by defendant while employing plaintiff’s 
mark.  It is, however, highly unlikely that each of the above elements 
will be the same, but if they are, a defendant in those circumstances 
will claim that money, alone, will compensate a plaintiff for its lost 
sales.  The defendant must be capable of paying the compensation.  
This analysis may be a bit shallow because enhanced production by 
plaintiff can lead to lower costs and increased market penetration, but 
even so, these losses may be capable of quantification and the cost to 
the plaintiff may be added to damages.  A court has discretion, 
subject to the principles of equity in awarding monetary damages in a 
trademark case.156  It can increase its award of damages up to three 
times the amount of actual damages; it can adjust its award of profits 
up or down as it “find[s] to be just.”157 
V. CONCLUSION 
The language of the Act fails to address harm to the consumer 
caused by the defendant’s acts of trademark infringement, as those 
harms are earlier described.  But Congress, nevertheless, intended the 
Act to protect consumers of trademarked goods and the testimony of 
Congressman Lanham reflected this, as did opinions of the Supreme 
Court.158  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in both eBay and Winter, 
neither being a trademark decision, did not have to address the harms 
caused to consumers by defendant’s acts of trademark 
 
154. E.g., George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 393 (4th Cir. 
2009) (applying nine factors enumerated in the case). 
155. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2012). 
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). 
157. Id. 
158. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1274–77 (1946). 
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infringement.159  These potential harms to consumers can include 
confusion, deception, and deprivation of an economic manner to 
accurately distinguish the goods of one seller from another.  These 
are critical benefits, and if taken from a consumer, they will harm the 
consumer.  
In a trademark infringement case, it is submitted, irreparable harm 
befalls those consumers of trademarked goods whose marks are the 
subject of infringement.  Once infringement is shown likely, it should 
not be necessary to establish that irreparable harm to the mark’s 
owner will follow.  The courts should consider the irreparable harm 
caused to consumers who are confused by the infringement or who 
make unintended selections of goods or services based on 
defendant’s use of an infringing mark.  This harm to the consumer, 
who is unable to represent himself in a Lanham Act claim, should be 
presumed and should form the basis for injunctive relief that will 
prevent a defendant from further use of a mark that will result in 
confusion.  A court should consider that these confused consumers do 
not have standing under the Act, and there is no one readily available 
to protect their interests.  Consumers should be free from confusion 
and deception and should be able to use marks to select services and 
products they desire to consume.  Requiring a mark’s owner to 
establish that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm as a condition to 
the issuance of injunction ignores the harm that will befall a class of 
consumers once the plaintiff establishes it is likely to succeed on the 
merits of its infringement claim or has already prevailed on the merits 
at trial, or by summary judgment.  Once the plaintiff establishes the 
likelihood of success, or actual success, on the merits, courts should 
recognize the interests of the consuming public and enjoin the 












159. The Court in eBay considered the act of copyright infringement.  The Court 
indicated its patent holding was consistent with its copyright holdings and that patent 
and copyright property rights were similar.  See supra pp. 379–81. 
